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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT : Committees of the U S Intelligence Board (USIB)

1. Recommendation No. 33 of the Joint Study Group (JSG) reflects, with respect to the intelligence community, the growing general disillusionment within the Executive Departments of a committee system of business. That recommendation calls for a review of "the functions and activities of the several committees and sub-committees of the United States Intelligence Board." It further directs that "this review should include consideration of possible change in the committee structure and improved reporting procedures." Implicit in the Joint Study Group's recommendation on this point and in its recommendations for a streamlining of USIB itself is concern at the ponderous appearance of the complex committee structure which now characterizes the organization of the intelligence community. The concern, however, does not appear to be directed at the functions with which the Committees are charged but rather at the question of whether the functions need to be assigned to committees or, in fact, can most efficiently be performed by committees.

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2. Now that the USIB itself will be streamlined and that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has the responsibility for coordinating all intelligence activities within the various elements of the Department of Defense (save those under the control of the National Security Agency) there are occurring basic changes in the high-level structure of U. S. intelligence which even more clearly imply a need for change at the supporting level. The observations that follow are directed at establishing a concept of coordinated support for the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and for the USIB that is workable, efficient, and compatible with the new top structure. As will appear -- and again the point is emphasized -- there is little question that the great majority of the USIB committees have been and are performing useful functions. The suggestions below are designed to ensure that the functions are carried out under closer supervision and clearer assignment of responsibility.

- 2 -

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3. At the present time, USIB has 21 permanent committees, concerned with a variety of production, collection, and support activities. The purposes for which these committees have been established fall, in a general sense, into three categories:

- (a) to provide a mechanism for achieving coordination of a specific community-wide activity, such as economic intelligence;
- (b) to provide a mechanism for providing community guidance to an activity of common concern, such as domestic exploitation of non-government organizations and individuals for foreign intelligence purposes;
- (c) to assist USIB in carrying out one of its assigned functions, such as security.

- 3 -

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4. The general functions of USIB are specified in National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 1. In addition to assisting the DCI to carry out his coordination functions, USIB has certain other specific responsibilities, in brief:

(a) Establish policies and programs for the guidance of departments and agencies.

(b) Establish priority national intelligence objectives and requirements.

x x (c) Review and report to the National Security Council (NSC) on the national foreign-intelligence effort.

(d) Make recommendations on foreign intelligence matters, particularly to the Secretary of Defense concerning matters under the cognizance of the Director, National Security Agency (NSA).

(e) Develop and review security standards and practices.

(f) Formulate policies concerning arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters.

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5. It is clear that USIB needs some type of committee structure to assist it in meeting these broad responsibilities. The variety of problems for which the Board has responsibility places a heavy burden upon the members. The Board deals effectively with national estimates, in large part because the mechanism of the Office of National Estimates (ONE) provides for community-wide staffing of the problem, and for clear definition of points at issue. It also receives comparable coordinated support through the Watch Committee procedure. On other problems, particularly in the field of collection, the Board has had less effective machinery for coordination and for the initiation of remedial action and too often has faced such problems at a late date, sometimes without benefit of community-wide proposals for their solution and with less than adequate knowledge of the views and reasoning of other agencies regarding them.

- 5 -

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6. Various alternatives have been suggested. One that has some appeal is a structure composed of three high-level committees, one for Production, one for Collection, and one for Support. Within this trio could be logically encompassed, functionally, the various responsibilities now charged to all the USIB Committees and to USIB. Under this concept, the senior committees would be composed of the Chiefs or their deputies of the production, collection, and support components, respectively, of the USIB agencies. At this level, the individuals involved, being specialists in production, collection, or support, could take action to ensure that their principals in USIB were called upon only for decisions of the highest order. Upon further analysis, however, it becomes apparent that there are important weaknesses in this line of solution. In the first place, there is no demonstrable need for a "Support" committee, since USIB is not charged with the administrative, logistics, legal, comptroller and similar responsibilities inherent in the operations of the individual intelligence agencies. In the second place, it is very difficult to establish that a production committee is necessary or even appropriate to meet USIB's needs for coordination of the production effort of the community. As mentioned earlier, the estimative process developed and operated by the community through the Office of National Estimates (ONE) as the DCI's instrument is a proven and effective method of demonstrating in broad terms the community's capability to produce all types of intelligence required in support of national security policies. The Watch Committee process adequately covers the

- 6 -

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problem of indications of hostilities. Two major fields of intelligence production for which responsibility is necessarily assigned to a number of agencies and therefore require community coordination, are scientific and economic. For both of these technical, specialized fields, mechanisms for coordination are already available through existing scientific and economic committees.

The factors which argue against the establishment of production and support committees are not, however, so apparent in the field of collection. In this field, in fact, (as will appear in paragraph 9.8² below) it would seem that a modification of the existing committee structure could well benefit the community.

- 7 -

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7. The desirable modifications in the present USIB committee structure would be those that:

a. recognize the generally greater cohesiveness of the intelligence community occasioned both by the experience and mutual confidence gained over the past 15 years, and by the potential for greater coordination within the Department of Defense resulting from the establishment of the DIA;

b. recognize that services of common concern, like assigned functions of primary responsibility, are essentially functions which can and should be charged directly to an individual agency, both for the principal conduct of the particular service or function and for its coordination throughout the community;

c. recognize that USIB needs, on a permanent basis, only those committees that are clearly required to support functions specified for USIB in NSCID 1 or to coordinate certain important functional programs (other than services of common concern) which are carried out by several agencies to meet their own and community needs.

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8. The following USIB committees should be disestablished and their general functions reassigned:

a. Committee on International Communism. This committee has been relatively inactive for some time and there does not appear to be a demonstrated justification for the continuation of a committee in this field. The Committee's assigned functions are essentially elements of an important aspect of political intelligence for which the Department of State has production responsibility, except for the production of NIS sections which have been transferred to CIA. The Committee's functions should, therefore, be assigned to the Department of State. Coordination should be achieved through specified points of contact designated by interested agencies.

b. Space Surveillance Intelligence Support Committee (SSISC). USIB approved Space Surveillance requirements, compiled by SSISC, are now an integral part of North American Air Defense Command's (NORAD) operational requirements. Responsibility for coordinating future space surveillance requirements for the intelligence community and levying them on NORAD should be assigned to the Department of Defense to be accomplished through specified points of contact designated by interested agencies.

- 9 -

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c. Domestic Exploitation Committee. Para. 7 of NSCID 2 assigns responsibility for the exploitation of non-government organizations and individuals for foreign intelligence purposes to the Central Intelligence Agency, as a service of common concern. The Committee should be eliminated and its functions assigned to CIA for implementation through specified points of contact designated by interested agencies.

d. Committee on Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications. DCID 2/4 charges CIA with providing for the exploitation of foreign language publications as a service of common concern. The committee should be eliminated as a USIB instrument, and its functions assigned to CIA for implementation through specified points of contact designated by interested agencies.

e. Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications (PROCIB). DCID 2/5 assigns to CIA responsibility for coordinating the foreign publications procurement programs. The committee should be eliminated as an instrument of the USIB, and its functions assigned to CIA for implementation through specified points of contact designated by interested agencies.

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f. Committee on Exchanges. This committee was established for the purpose of providing coordinated advice to the Department of State on the intelligence aspects of the East-West Exchange program and of ensuring coordinated intelligence exploitation of the program. As a practical matter, the committee's functions have for some time been carried out primarily by CIA, which has provided this service as if it were one of common concern. The need for the committee has thus become minimal. It should be disestablished and its functions assigned to CIA for implementation through specified points of contact designated by interested agencies.*

g. National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Committee. NSCID 3 assigns to the Director of Central Intelligence responsibility for coordinating production and for accomplishing the publication and dissemination of National Intelligence Surveys. The NSC, by its approval in 1948 of the NIS Standard Instructions, required that CIA provide over-all coordination of the NIS Program. By the same action it created the NIS Committee to assist the CIA in carrying out this primary responsibility for the program. The program is now well established. The committee as a USIB instrument should be eliminated and its functions assigned to CIA for implementation through specified points of contact designated by interested agencies.**

*There is an alternative line of action that received strong support within the Coordination Staff: to assign the functions of the Department of State, in view of State's overall responsibility for the conduct of the East-West Exchange program. (The Coordination Staff would appreciate your comments as to these two alternatives to assist the Staff in arriving at a single recommendation in the final draft of this paper.)

**NSC approval for this change is not required, since NSCID 3 of 18 January 1961 permits amendments to the NIS Standard Instructions by interdepartmental approval.

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h. Critical Communications Committee (CCC). This committee has substantially completed its mission, the establishment of a well understood system of rapid transmission of critical information. This committee should now be disestablished and CIA made responsible for a continuous coordinated monitoring of this community intelligence reporting system, in conjunction with the continuing responsibility of the Secretary of Defense under NSCID No. 7 to provide for the establishment, operation and perfection of the necessary means of communication.

i. Emergency Planning Steering Committee. This Committee was created by USIB action and, when active, concerned itself largely with emergency relocation matters. The Committee has been inactive for more than a year. Whereas relocation planning has proceeded on a coordinated Departmental and Agency basis, there is still needed national level resolution concerning overall wartime operation of intelligence departments and agencies in order that they may proceed with realistic intelligence war planning. The Committee should be disestablished and the overall problem of developing a wartime concept of operations for the foreign intelligence community should be undertaken by the DCI as the principal intelligence coordinator of the U. S. foreign intelligence effort.

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9. The following USIB committees should be retained or modified
(See Tab A):

a. Security Committee. The Security Committee provides direct support to USIB with respect to a specific function assigned to USIB by NSCID No. 1, namely, the development and review of security standards and practices. It should therefore be retained.

b. The Signal Intelligence Committee.* The Signal Intelligence Committee likewise provides direct support to USIB with respect to a specific function assigned to USIB by NSCID No. 1, namely, recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters within the jurisdiction of the Director, NSA. It should therefore be retained.

c. Committee on Documentation (CODIB). The Committee on Documentation should be retained since it supports USIB with respect to a specific community-wide function requiring effective coordination, especially in carrying out approved Joint Study Group (JSG) Recommendation No. 40, relating to automatic data processing systems.

d. Watch Committee. The Watch Committee, in view of its special relation to a general USIB function and the necessity for broad community participation in finalizing reports on imminence of hostilities, should also be retained.

*For purposes of this paper the term Signal Intelligence Committee has been used to cover the existing COMINT and ELINT Committees, which, in accordance with earlier USIB decision, are scheduled to be merged into a single committee.

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e. Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC). The Economic Intelligence Committee should be retained, because its work involves the coordination of important functional programs necessarily conducted by most USIB agencies as well as by some 9 non-USIB agencies.

f. Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC).* The Scientific Intelligence Committee should be retained because of its general production and coordination responsibilities in an important field in which several USIB agencies have large active programs.

g. Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)* and Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committees (GMAIC).* The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee and the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee should also be retained because of the critical importance of their individual responsibilities and USIB's direct and priority interest in these subjects.

*Because of the close relationship of these three scientific committees, close coordination is imperative. The SIC should be charged with taking the leadership in insuring that such coordination is effected in areas of joint or overlapping concern, such as the field of anti-ballistic missiles. This does not imply that SIC should have a supervisory role over the normal activities of JAEIC and GMAIC in their respective fields.

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Problems

h. Critical Collection Committee (CCPC). Recent USIB actions to intensify collection efforts in Southeast Asia and Berlin, as well as current community interest in improving collection in a number of important scientific and technical fields illustrate the need for a mechanism which can ensure that collection efforts utilizing all community resources in these and other similar major problem areas are adequately coordinated, and which can anticipate collection problems and undertake remedial action thereon on its own initiative. The CCPC, as now established, cannot fill the need, since its activities are limited by DCID 2/2 solely to those collection problems of a critical nature specifically referred to it by the USIB. The required mechanism could be provided by broadening the present charter of the CCPC (Director of Central Intelligence Directive 2/2) to permit the committee to concern itself with collection problems of general community interest referred to it by USIB, by a USIB committee or agency, or identified by the committee itself. In dealing with such problems, the revised CCPC should have essentially those responsibilities listed in para. 1 of DCID 2/2:

- (a). Making an inventory of collection capabilities or action being taken or planned.
- (b). Allocating by agreement, or recommending actions to be taken to improve collection capabilities.
- (c). Fostering the generation of new ideas and techniques for collection; selecting those of value, and supporting their development and use.

- 15 -

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(d). Studying results of collection actions in order to recommend improvements.

(e). Recommending actions to improve speed and accuracy of collection and dissemination of information.

The revised and strengthened CCPC could have a subcommittee structure consisting of the present Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC), Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) and Interagency Defector Committee (IDC), and such additional subcommittees and ad hoc task forces as may be necessary from time to time. This arrangement would not affect the present working procedures of the existing three committees, but could ensure that their activities bearing on an identified problem were appropriately coordinated and correlated with other collection activities. The Chairman and a small professional staff of the proposed committee should necessarily be full time, to provide a continuous basis for community wide scrutiny and action on collection problems.

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10. USIB Secretariat. The USIB secretariat should be strengthened so that it may devote increased efforts in ensuring that papers coming before the Board have had, where appropriate, adequate preliminary coordination and in conducting an effective follow-up system on Board decisions. The Executive Secretary should be assigned to the office of the DCI in his capacity as chairman of USIB, and thus organizationally separate from any USIB member agency.

DRAFT

- 17 -

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Tab A

